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STUDENT NOTES
SPECMC PEBFORANE-PAROL CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND.-A made
an oral contract with B, whereby in consideration of her personal services to him and in consideration of her continuance of these services
toward him, he would leave her his property at his death. A died
intestate and B asks for a decree vesting the property in her by way
of specific performance or of charging it with a trust. B, a niece of
A's wife, never lived in his home, nor he in hers. She lived with her
father, held a clerical position, and was married some years before
A's death. She gave A a great deal of her time and companionship,
but never performed personal or domestic services for him. He did
not need them. The court reversed the lower court's finding for the
plaintiff and held, B was not entitled to .specific performance of the
agreement made with A on the ground that she had done nothing
incapable of adequate money compensation. Simonson v. Mosely, 183
Minn. 525, 237 N. W. 413 (1931).
The rule of the case is that even where an oral contract to devise
property at death has been sEatisfactorily established, specific performance will not be decreed in absence of such performance on the part of
the beneficiary as will place her in a position in which she cannot be
adequately compensated in damages. But the converse of this rule
ic equally true, that where such contract has been clearly established
and the plaintiff has performed to such an extent and in such manner
that he cannot be adequately compensated in damages, specific performance will be decreed, and it has been so held in Minnesota, the
jurisdiction of the principal case. Colby v. Street, 151 Minn. 25, 185
N. W. 954 (1921).
Specific performance of oral contracts to convey land on the
theory that "part performance" takes the contract out of the statute
of frauds, has long been dealt with by courts of equity. The doctrine
of part performance was established early in English law and has
been adopted in nearly all the American states. Pomeroy, Specific
Performance of Contracts, 3rd. ed., sec. 96. In applying this doctrine
the courts seem to run counter to the clear import of the statute, but
they justify this apparent disregard on the ground that since the
statute is to prevent fraud it cannot be used to perpetrate a fraud.
Pomeroy aptly states the principle behind every case when he says,
(supra, sec. 106), "if the refusal to complete the verbal contract which
has been partly performed, would, within the established doctrines of
equity, operate as a fraud upon the party who has done the acts, then
a court of equity will compel the wrongdoer to bear the results of his
bad faith, and will not suffer him to use the statute of frauds as a
cover for his unjust and inequitable conduct"
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In dealing with the problem two steps must be considered: first,
the oral contract which must be established to the satisfaction of the
court, and second, the part performance or simply, the performance,
on the part of the plaintiff. Naturally both must occur before specific
performance can be granted, and in addition, the second must be done
pursuant to and in reliance upon the first, and must refer to it.
All cases recognizing the doctrine hold in accord that the oral
contract must be established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing
proof. Unless this is done, the court will go no further. Williams v.
Corcoran, 346 Ill. 105, 178 N. E. 348 (1931); Baker v. Fowler, 247 N. W.
676 (Iowa 1933); Goodwin v. Cornelius, 101 Ore. 422, 200 Pac. 915
(1921); Buck v. Meyer, 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997 (1916).
The first step having been successfully made, the second equally
essential, must be debated. Do the acts on the part of the plaintiff
constitute sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the
statute of frauds? These acts vary as to their nature, but where performed in pursuance to the contract established and in reliance thereon, they are sufficient if they have placed the plaintiff in a position
where he cannot be adequately compensated in damages. Cannon v.
Cannon. 158 Va. 12, 163 S. E. 405 (1932).
Thus specific performance was granted where the plaintiff had
moved onto the promisor's place in reliance upon the agreement, and
had made valuable improvements on the property without compensation. Ellis v. Reagan, 172 Ga. 181, 157 S. E. 478 (1931). Possession
of property and improvements thereon by the promisee is sufficient
in Michigan. Woodworth v. Porter, 224 Mich. 470, 194 N. W. 1015
(1923). Abandonment of the home place by the promisee in order to
live with the promisor and keep house for him has been held part
performance entitling the plaintiff to specific enforcement of the
agreement. Huse v. Moore, 261 Mich. 288, 246 N. W. 123 (1931).
Consideration of personal services and care given by the plaintiff to
the decedent for the remainder of his life is good in Nebraska. Weber
v. Crabill, 123 Neb. 88, 242 N. W. 267 (1933).
Perhaps a better way of stating the proposition is expressed by
the court in Wilcox v. Powell's Estate, 206 Wis. 513, 240 N. W. 122
(1932), that where the plaintiff has performed acts of such character
that "to deny them specific enforcement would operate as a fraud upon
them and the prevention of fraud is the basis and reason for the
equitable relief of specific performance." It is submitted that in the
final analysis of the problem, this is the correct basis for granting the
decree.
No matter what acts are done by the plaintiff in compliance with
the agreement, If he cannot be adequately compensated at law and a
refusal of specific performance would operate as a fraud upon him,
equity should give relief. Conversely, whatever acts are done by the
plaintiff, unless to deny him relief would cause him unjust loss and
Injury amounting to fraud, specific performance should not be decreed.
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In short, nothing should be construed as part performance which does
not put a party in a' situation which is a fraud upon him unless the
agreeient be fully performed. Weir v. Weir 287 ,Ill. 495, 122 N. E. 868
(1919). Whether the' plaintiff has shown equities entitling him to relief, 'h~wever, depends upon the facts of each case, and the mere ,fact
that he'does not get what he was to receive inder the parol ,agreement is not sufficient loss' or injury to 'constitute fraud. Happel v.
.
Hq#Ppe1,- 184 Minn. 377, 238 N. W. 783 (1931).
o Only is the doctriiie of part performance in ilation to specifi
performance 'ofparol contracts followed in most states' of the Union,
but hi some it has received sanction by statute. Such statutes are of
two clases. The first recdgnizes the doctrine and declares nothing n
the tatut shall 'be construed to abridge it. The lNew York siatute
Ieclares: "Nothing contained in this article abridges the' lowers of
''lerfrmance 'of agreements In
cours of equity to compel the s
cases of part performance." Cahill's' Consolidated Laws of
ch. 51,sec.
Similar provisions may be found in
sota, Nebraska, and Wsconsin.

~.

(i 30),
Minne-

The second type of statute requires, in order to make a contract
yalidto- convey land, a w iting or, certain specified acts, of part performance in ,the altprnatve, part,, performance,,is made a matter of
legislation. , See, Alabama Civil ,Code (1923),,sec., 8034-(K); Iowa Code
-:
:..
.
,
(,:1931),sec. 11285-11286..
The- doctrine ot part performance as a basis,! for specific enforcenient bf parol contracts' to ddvise realty is recognized and 'upheld In i
leadiig' U. S. Supreme court ,cake. -Brow ,v.f Sutton#, 129 ,U. S., 238, 9
S.CtJ273 (1888). Clear and conclusive proof of.the termf of the condact-are'irequired, and a showing, that, .compensation by damages is
impossibld,-' resulting ,in a fraUdi 6n Ithe injured -party.' WiMams v.
Without attempting to deWorrig, 95, U. S. A44-, 24 L. Ed. 360 (1877)
cideWhat ,particular acts will ilisb'factobe sufficient ,to' remove the
case from the statute the rule 'laid down is that the' acts done by the
plaintiff must be of such nature that damages will, be inadequate relief.
.
'Haffier v, _DdbrbisTi,- 215 U,' S. 446- (1909).
'
The federal courts look' 'to the law' of' the forum where, the statute
6f friuids' is involved 'ahd if' byi hat la'the';tatute' is'procedural, the
'IaW bf' thd6'frum controls. Lvi V.'"Murel, 63 'Fed. '(2d)' '610 (1933).
n'i; sichle'vent,' Whether specific perfotainihce'1wil- be, decreed dpends
'upon the rule 'of'the forum. 'The riie as-expressed by the, federal
courts, however, is in accord with the weight of authority that evidence
to establish a'parol contract t6 devise property must be clear, satisfactory; and 'convincing.,. Frenzprv Frenzer 2 Fed. (2d)- 219 (1924). Mere
statements of intention to, devise, property is not- sufficient, Faunco v.
Wood9,5'- Fed. (2d) 753 (1925). Moreover, 'where the consideration for
'the promiseis 'personal service, or other acts done by the promisee not
susceptible to money valuation, it -must have been substantially re-
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celved at the promisor's death.. Jaffee v. Jacobson, 48 Fed.,21, (191),
dictum, It Is Inconceivable that part performance to any -less extent
could be strong enough reason for taking the contract out of the statute of frauds In order- to -prevent fraud, but if the consideration for
the agreement has been given during the life of the promisor, there
Is no just reason why the promisee should not have-.specific performance where compensation Is otherwise- unavailable. In this .connection
the test for enforceability of parol promises to devise realty, a proposed by the court in Faunce v. Woods -(supra),seems to be. sound.
As therein stated, the test Is whether the plaintiff under the parol
agreement could have prevented the decedent from disposing, of the
property In question during his lifetime., It, is submitted that-Such
a step could only be taken in event the plaintiff has so far performed
the consideration upon which the agreement is based, that he has
placed himself in a position where he will suffer, irreparable injuryrif
specific performance. is refused., Equity wilL then :grant,relief-on the
ground of equitable, fraud,, upon which American courts are showing
a marked tendency to rest, the dpctrine., See MoreJand,:, Statute of
Frauds and Part Performance ,78 U. ,o, Pa.
Rev.
U.. j5!,
81
o-.
The rule - Is: dented by, four states: - Teiness~e, Mississippi; l'brth
o ake
Carolina, and Kentucky. The North Carolina courts 'efuse td
the contract out of the ,statute even on' the ground 'of part-erfornixnce. Ellis v. Ellis, .16'N. C. 189 (1829) ;, Pass v. 'Brooks,125 N. a, 12,
34 S. E. 228 (1899). The doctrine has been'r'epudiated as flatly Inohsistent with the statute of frauds and no amount of part performance
will relieve the case of its application. Goodloe v. (loodloe,,116Tenn,
252, 92 S. W., 767 (1906).1 o.
..
.. " !:, ,' f. Perhaps thew 'most' unequivocal language in, opposition to the rule
may be found in the early case of Box v. Stanford, 13 Smedes &-lM.' 93,
51 Am. Dec. -142 (Miss. 1849). The argument is that the gtahites -are
a guide for the courts as well as for the country and they- have' -n:
dispensing power over them. Where they contain no exceptionfs-, the
courts can make'none. Therefore no e~ceptions of the characiterof
part performance will be ingrafted into the statute. If the stath6't4 is
too rigid ,and works a fraud the remedy should be by legislatiVe enactment. This decision has been uniformly followed by the c6drts 'odf
Mississippi. Washington v. Soria, 73 Miss. 665, 19 So. 485 (1896);
Milan v. Paxton, 160 Miss. 562, 134 So.. 171 (1931).
The Kentucky rule is clearly given In Doty's Admrs, ,. DotV's
Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S. W. 803 (1904), that title to land cannot
be acquired by a parol contract and part performance will not take
the case out of the statute. This is followed by the Kentucky. court
wherever the question arises. Duke's Admr. v. f/rump, 185 Ky. '323,
215 S. W. 41 (1919). A leading case is Walker v- Dill's AdMr., 186
Ky. 638, 218 S. W. 247 (1920), which held no acts of service or delivery of consideration on the part of the plaintiff will take the oral
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contract out of the statute of frauds. Realizing, perhaps, the strictness
of the rule and the resulting injustice, the court held that the party
performing the services is not without a remedy, but may recover the
reasonable value of his services. This holding is undoubtedly sound
and does not differ from that of other jurisdictions where the pecuniary
value of the services can be determined. Specific performance was refused in the principal case for this sole reason.
But where the thing done "is of such nature as not to admit of
reduction to monetary value," the Kentucky cases differ greatly from
the majority. The former will receive the contract for the purpose of
fixing the value of those services. The latter hold, in such event, that
specific performance will be granted, because if the plaintiff cannot
be compensated in money the transaction will operate as a fraud upon
him. If the services themselves cannot be valued in money, how can
the contract put such value on them? Moreover, the services are not
given for money in these cases, but in expectation of receiving property, and in many of the contracts the value of the services in money
is not determined and cannot be inferred therefrom. The court held
further, that where land or property is devised, it cannot in itself be
recovered, but the value thereof may be paid to the plaintiff. Such recovery will not compensate the plaintiff in all cases. The objection
is that in most cases the plaintiff has made the agreement for a particular piece of property, a certain home, and money value in lieu
thereof will not be adequate compensation.
The Kentucky cases of parol contract to convey will allow the
plaintiff to recover the "value" of what he would have received under
the agreement, but in refusing to go further when the circumstances
demand it, they are contra to the majority rule and the established
principle of equity. If the contract is to be received for the purpose of
ascertaining the "compensation" due the plaintiff thereunder, what
logical reason can be advanced for refusing to consider it in the light
of specific performance? The courts denying the doctrine may be
holding the statute as a "shield" to keep out fraud, but under the
equities involved it seems that such rule is too narrow to be just.
The application of the Minnesota rule offers a better solution to the
problem.
GEoRGE 0. ELrnIm.

CENsoRsnIP OF RADIO PROGRA

S AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH.-Begin-

ning with the case of KFKB BroadcastingAssociation v. Federal Radio
Commission, 47 Fed. (2d) 670 (1931), the eyes of contributors to legal
periodicals have been focused with increasing sharpness upon those
decisions of the courts which have attempted to resolve the inherent
conflict between Section 11 and Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927.
(See 47 U. S. C. A., Sections 91 and 109, respectively.)
Section 11 provides: "If upon examination of any application for a
station license or for the renewal or modification of a station license

